INTRODUCTION
The periodic or non-periodic test and maintenance activities in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are essential for stable power production and the sustainment of the plant safety. However, due to NPP system complexity and human limitation in cognition and action, these activities may also have the potential to induce unwanted and unanticipated reactor trip events and may render critical systems unavailable.
Several studies have been conducted in the arena of maintenance human factors. James Reason emphasized the importance of maintenance-related human errors as well as human errors in responding to emergency situations [1] . Dhillon addressed the research status on human errors in test and maintenance tasks in several industries including nuclear power plants, aviation, and chemical processing plants, etc. [2] . Seminara and Parson reviewed the status of human factors engineering research in the domain of power plant maintenance [3] . Pyy analyzed the types of common cause failures in maintenancerelated tasks in nuclear power plants [4] , and Toriizuka presented a work improvement method using performance shaping factors in industrial plant maintenance tasks [5] .
This paper is concerned with human errors in test and maintenance activities of NPPs that have the potential for inducing unplanned reactor trips. The Korean regulatory organization for nuclear and radiological systems, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), provides a list of the major events, including unplanned reactor trips and unplanned initiations of safety systems that have occurred in Korean nuclear power plants, on a public website, the Operational Performance Information System (OPIS), http://opis.kins.re.kr [6] . According to OPIS, about 23% of the events that occurred during 2002 ~ 2006 were caused by human error. More recently, during 2004 2 005, the contribution of human error to the unplanned reactor trip events has grown to about 34%, a significant increase.
Interest in analyzing and reducing the human-induced
In this paper, the contribution of task types and error types involved in the human-related unplanned reactor trip events that have occurred between 1986 and 2006 in Korean nuclear power plants are analysed in order to establish a strategy for reducing the human-related unplanned reactor trips. Classification systems for the task types, error modes, and cognitive functions are developed or adopted from the currently available taxonomies, and the relevant information is extracted from the event reports or judged on the basis of an event description. According to the analyses from this study, the contributions of the task types are as follows: corrective maintenance (25.7%), planned maintenance (22.8%), planned operation (19.8%), periodic preventive maintenance (14.9%), response to a transient (9.9%), and design/manufacturing/installation (6.9%). According to the analysis of the error modes, error modes such as control failure (22.2%), wrong object (18.5%), omission (14.8%), wrong action (11.1%), and inadequate (8.3%) take up about 75% of the total unplanned trip events. The analysis of the cognitive functions involved in the events indicated that the planning function had the highest contribution (46.7%) to the human actions leading to unplanned reactor trips. This analysis concludes that in order to significantly reduce humaninduced or human-related unplanned reactor trips, an aide system (in support of maintenance personnel) for evaluating possible (negative) impacts of planned actions or erroneous actions as well as an appropriate human error prediction technique, should be developed.
or human-related unplanned reactor trip events has been increasing gradually in response to the increased number of human-induced unplanned reactor trip events. In response to this interest, and in an attempt to establish a strategy for reducing these human-related unplanned reactor trips, this report analyses the overall task types and error types contributing to the human-induced or human-related unplanned reactor trip events between 1986 and 2006. The analysis items presented in this paper include the task types (or types of activity), and the error modes and cognitive functions involved in the humanrelated unplanned reactor trip events. We note that analysis of the causes and context involving the so-called MTO (man, technology, and organization) factors and latent conditions that lead to human errors are important considerations in the effective management of human error [7, 8] . A root cause analysis method, or HuRAM for short (Human-related Root cause Analysis Method), was developed and used to identify important root causes leading to human-related unplanned reactor trips [9] .
With the exception of the root cause analysis, this paper presents some insights, garnered from the analysis of task types and error types, on how to possibly reduce humanrelated unplanned reactor trip events. Classification systems for the task types, error modes, and cognitive functions are developed or adopted from the currently available taxonomies in order to extract those kinds of information from the event reports. The decision of an appropriate type among various ones is made by the analysts by adhering to the definitions of the classification schemes.
STATUS OF HUMAN-RELATED UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS IN KOREA
Task and error-type analysis was performed on the incident reports for the unplanned reactor trip events between 1986 and 2006. These reports are provided by the OPIS website [6] . The latter provides detailed and/or summarized event reports in chronological order, event classification according to initiating event location (i.e., primary-system related or secondary-system related), and primary cause divided into the four categories of human, mechanical, instrumental, and electrical-related. The primary cause contributing to the occurrence of an event is usually determined by analyst judgment. The humaninduced and human-related unplanned reactor trip events are extracted from the total reported events and organized according to their primary causes and related systems as seen in Table 1 .
Of the 101 human-related unplanned reactor trip events that occurred between 1986 and 2006, 33% were associated with the primary system. The remainder was all "secondary-system" events. The events classified as a "human-cause" take up 73%. The remaining humanrelated trip events were mechanical, instrumental, and electrical in nature. The presence of these latter events is indicative of latent human factors.
TASK TYPES INVOLVED IN HUMAN-RELATED UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS
Human actions involved in the human-related unplanned reactor trips are classified into task (or activity) types which serve as categorized groups of plant personnel's activities requested during non-emergency situations in nuclear power plants. Seven task types considered in this study are: planned maintenance, periodic preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, corrective maintenance, planned operation, response to a transient, and design-implementation-manufacturinginstallation. The classification of the task types and their definitions are provided in Table 2 . Of these, planned maintenance, periodic preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, and corrective maintenance are plant maintenance activities introduced in the administrative standard operating procedure (SOP) of the YGN 3&4 The Primary Cause The number of events related to the primary system
The number of events related to the secondary system
The number of events by cause category 
NPPs [10]. Planned operation, response to a transient, and design-implementation-manufacturing-installation'
are additional task types considered to classify the human actions involved in the unplanned reactor trip events. The human actions involved in the unplanned reactor trip events were analyzed according to the classification system for the task types. The results are given in Table 3 . No human-related unplanned reactor trip events were found for the human actions during predictive maintenance. The sub-task types, such as testing, calibration, and maintenance, as well as the basic task types of planned maintenance, periodic preventive maintenance, and corrective maintenance are shown in Table 3 .
The results indicate that corrective maintenance, planned maintenance, and periodic preventive maintenance activities contribute a large portion to the unplanned reactor trips common to the primary system and the secondary systems, and that the contribution of planned operation and response to a transient to the unplanned reactor trips for the events related to the secondary system is relatively high in comparison to the events related to the primary system. This is due in part because the plant response of the secondary system by a plant operation is more sensitive than for the primary system. Identification of specific tasks involved in the planned operation and response to a transient activities indicates that about 70% of the planned operation events and about 90% of the response to a transient events in the secondarysystem related events are directly related to failure of a steam generator level control or a feedwater control at around 20% of a normal power.
According to the analysis of the sub-task types such as test, calibration, and maintenance, the calibration task shows a relative low frequency over all the task types. In the case of planned maintenance, the test and maintenance tasks take up a much larger proportion of the events, and in the case of periodic preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance, the test task and the maintenance task have the single largest contribution to the unplanned reactor trips for each task type, respectively.
ERROR TYPES INVOLVED IN HUMAN-RELATED UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIPS
Cognitive functions and error modes for the human actions involved in the human-related unplanned reactor trip events were analyzed as error types. Cognitive 
Cognitive Functions
The following four cognitive functions, which are the basic elements of the Hollnagel's Simple Model of Cognition (SMoC) [7] , are adopted in this study.
Observation function Interpretation function Planning function Execution function Definitions for these four cognitive functions are provided in Table 4 .
The results of the analysis of the cognitive functions for 101 human-related unplanned reactor trip events are given in Table 5 . The planning function had the highest contribution (as much as 46.7%) of all the relevant cognitive functions. Its contribution is followed by the observation function (23.4%), the execution function (17.8%), and the interpretation function (10.3%). If we 
Cognitive function
The Table 3 . Classification of the Human-Related Unplanned Reactor Trip Events by Task Types examine the cause of the human erroneous actions, most of the events in which a major cognitive function was classified as the planning function occurred because plant personnel did not recognise the negative effects of the planned sequences of the test or maintenance tasks on a plant system. In particular, it is noted that about 52% (14 events of 27) of the events during the corrective maintenance activities are related to a failure of the planning function.
The results of the cognitive function analysis for the events related to the primary system are shown in Table  6 . The contribution of each cognitive function is as follows: the planning function (47.1%), the observation function (23.5%), the interpretation function (14.7%), and the execution function (11.8%). For the corrective maintenance, the planning function takes up 67% (8 events of 12) of the events.
The results of the cognitive function analysis for the events related to the secondary system are provided in Table 7 . The contributions of the cognitive functions are the planning function (46.6%), the observation function (23.3%), the execution function (20.5%), and the interpretation function (8.2%). The task types where the planning function takes up a large portion of the events are the planned operation (65%; 11 events of 17), the response to a transient (64%; 7 events of 11), and the corrective maintenance (40%; 6 events of 15 
Error Modes
The classification system used for the error mode analysis is based on the taxonomy of error modes of Hollnagel's CREAM [7] . Ten of the twenty-two error modes of CREAM were identified in this analysis. Four additional error modes, such as control failure, inadequate, miscalibration, and wrong input were also resulting in a total of fourteen error modes adddressed in this study.
The control failure mode is used for the failure to control a dynamic plant variable. It can, in fact, can be viewed as a failure mode resulting from other error modes such as action at an inappropriate time. However, the latter error mode is used for event for which an accurate error mode is difficult to pinpoint in the event of a failure to control a dynamic variable. The taxonomy and definitions of the error mdoes used in this study are given in Table 8 .
The results of the error mode analysis for the events related to the primary and secondary systems are provided in Table 9 and Table 10 , respectively. A combined table of the error modes from both systems related events is not presented here because the distribution of the error mode contributions in a combined result is dominated by the one of the secondary-system related events. Error modes such as omission (23.5%), wrong object (23.5%), and wrong action (17.6%) take up 64.6% of the total error modes for the events related to the primary system. Error modes such as control failure (28.8%), wrong object (16.4%), omission (11.0%), and inadequate (9.6%) takes up 66% of the secondary-system related error modes.
The reason why the control failure mode takes up a large portion of the total error modes is that the failure to control the steam generator feedwater during planned operation and response to a transient contributes to the unplanned reactor trips by about 27% of the secondary system events.
DISCUSSION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS
Validity or reliability of the classified task types, error modes and cognitive functions involved in the humanrelated unplanned reactor trip events are the focus of this section. The discussion is solely based on the authors' experience in determining the most appropriate types of tasks and actions of the operators or the maintenance personnel involved in the events.
The analysis was, for the most part, conducted by an analyst through discussions with another reviewer. Difficulties in drawing conclusions about the reliability and consistency of the results between analysts were resultant. Therefore, we want to discuss the validity of our results from the viewpoint of clarity (or ambiguity) in the type-determination of events. Task-type determination was relatively easy task as the event report describes the type of activity directly or indirectly. We estimate that more than 90% of the events lend themselves well to the determination of a task type. The remaining events (about 10%) task types could be deduced with moderate certainty. The situation for determining error modes is much the same as for the task types since most of the event reports describe the actions of the operators or the maintenance personnel specifically, such as "omitted a step from a procedure", "acted on a neighboring object", or "wrongly touched an irrelevant object adjacent to a workspace". We estimate that around 10-20% of the events has an ambiguity problem in terms of determining an appropriate error mode involved in human actions due to a rough description of the action involved.
As for the cognitive functions, the most influential, one major cognitive function that led to a manifestation of an external error mode was determined to see the statistical distribution of the major cognitive function involved in a human erroneous action. Identification of major cognitive functions that contribute to an erroneous action may require a deliberate (subjective) judgment of an analyst from the description of the human actions involving the sequence of events under analysis. For some events, determination of the most influential cognitive function seemed ambiguous because the cognitive functions involved in an event are closely interrelated with each other. About 20% of the events were estimated to have such ambiguities due to a poor description of an event progression or an inherent coupled-nature of the cognitive functions. The determination of a major cognitive function for the observation and the execution functions seems to be relatively straightforward. A more deliberate judgement is required for the events in which the interpretation and planning functions are closely interrelated. For such events, we tried to stick to the definition of each cognitive function, i.e., whether the problem is more on the plant personnel's identification of system states or diagnosis of plant situations, or on planning on how to respond to a given situation or how to take actions to correct a problematic situation on the basis that they made a correct situation assessment. 
